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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THE 1987-1988 TERM (PART II)
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead 1/1 & Richard W Weatherhead
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
This is the second of two articles reviewing this Term's
decisions by the United States Supreme Court.

DEATH PENALTY
Age of Defendant
The defendant in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct.
2687 (1988), was 15 years old when he participated in a
brutal murder. The prosecution's motion to have
Thompson tiied as an adult iathei than as a juvenile was
granted. He was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed
by a 15-year-old child violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The plurality commenced its analysis by observing
that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment made no
attempt to define what constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Consequently, the Court has made that
determination guided by the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
In this context, the Court has looked to legislative enactments, sentencing jury determinations, and the reasons
underlying such laws and decisions.
The plurality first considered the legislative treatment
of 15-year-old children. No state permits children of that
age to vote or serve on juries. In all but one state a 15year-old may not drive without parental consent. Simiiarly, in all but four states, a 15-year-old cannot marry without parental consent. Most importantly, all states designate
the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at not
less than 16. "All of this legislation is consistent with the
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our
law, that the normal15-year-old is not prepared to assume
the full responsibilities of an adult." 108 S.Ct. at 2693.
Most states have not set a minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty. However, of the 18 states that
have set a minimum age, all require that the defendant
have attained the age of 16 at the time of the offense.
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.Next the plurality reviewed jury behavior. The best
evidence indicates that between 18 and 20 children
under 16 have been executed in this century. Significantly, none had been executed since 1948. The plurality
believed that this forty-year moratorium was important.
"The road we have traveled during the past four decades
-in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases
-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now
generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community."
. /d. at 2697.
Finally, the plurality examined the reasons underlying
the differential treatment of children. "Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less
able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an
adult." /d. at 2699. Given these factors, retribution and
deterrence, the underlying rationales for the death penalty, do not apply. The child is less culpable, and he is less
likely to be deterred. Accordingly, the plurality found the
death penalty violative of the Eighth Amendment. The
plurality, however, limited its decision to children under 16.
The decisive vote was cast by Justice O'Connor, who
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor
agreed in the judgment but on narrower grounds. The
constitutional violation, in her view, was the legislature's
failure to specify a minimum age: "In this unique situation, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner and others
who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense
may not be executed under the authority of a capital
punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at
which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the
offender's execution." /d. at 4904.

Jury Selection
Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2273 (1988), concerned
the jury selection process in a capital murder case. By
statute, each side had nine peremptory challenges.
Twelve jurors were initially selected and examined by the
court and counsel. If a juror was excused for cause,
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another was called and examined. After 12 jurors had
been provisionally seated, the parties exercised their
peremptory challenges alternately. The prosecutor went
first. When a juror was struck, a replacement was called
and examined. Once the replacement was provisionally
seated, the strikes would continue until all the peremptory challenges had been used or waived.
Darrell Huling was a replacement for the juror excused
due to the defense's exercise of its fifth peremptory.
During examination, he stated that he would automatically impose the death penalty if the defendant were found
guilty. The defense moved to challenge him for cause.
When the motion was denied, the defense used a peremptory challenge to have him removed. The proceedings continued until the defense had used all of its
peremptory challenges. Ross was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. He argued that the trial
court's failure to strike Huling violated his right to an
impartial jury and due process.
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. There was
no dispute that the trial court had committed an error in
not striking Huling. Had Huling remained on the jury,
Ross's right to an impartial jury would have been violated. Huling, however, was not on the jury. He was removed with a peremptory challenge. Moreover, none of
the 12 jurors who sat were challenged for cause, nor did
Ross ever suggest that any of them was not impartial.
Ross;s argument focused on the fact that had he not
had to use his peremptory challenge on Huling, he might
have struck one of the other jurors. Thus, the jury panel
would have been different. The Court simply did not
believe that this difference was significant.
[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional
right to an impartial jury. We have long recognized that
peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension ... They are a means to achieve the end of an
impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial,
the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory
challenge to achieve that result does not mean the
Sixth Amendment was violated. /d. at 2278.

constituted harmless error. Some constitutional errors
cast so much doubt on the fairness of the process that
they can never be considered harmless. For example,
Sixth Amendment violations that pervade the entire
proceeding fall within this category. Thus, in Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Court wrote: "[W)hen
a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance
of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or
during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a
capital case, reversal is automatic." /d. at 489. A different
analysis, however, controls when a right to counsel violation is limited to the erroneous admission of particular
evidence. Hence, confessions and line-ups conducted in
violation of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless
error analysis. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371
(1972); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). According to
the Court, these latter cases governed.
In applying the harmless error rule, however, the Court
could not conclude that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The psychiatrist was the only licensed
physician to testify at the sentencing hearing and his
opinion was devastating: Satterwhite was "beyond the
reach of psychiatric rehabilitation." Consequently, the
judgment was reversed.
Aggravating Circumstance - Prior Conviction
The defendant in Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S.Ct.
1981 (1988), was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. Three aggravating circumstances provided the
basis for the sentence. One of these concerned a prior
felony involving the use or threat of violence to another.
In Johnson's case a 1963 New York conviction for the
crime of second-degree assault with intent to commit
rape was introduced. After the Mississippi conviction,
Johnson's attorneys successfully challenged the 1963
conviction in the New York courts. They then moved to
vacate the Mississippi death sentence because it had
been based on an invalid New York conviction. The
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the motion.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The
Court held that an invalid conviction meant that Johnson
should be presumed innocent, unless and until he was
retried and convicted. Since only the record of conviction
was admitted in the sentencing hearing, the State could
not argue that the underlying conduct was sufficient to
uphold the death penalty. In support of its decision, the
Court cited two aspects of its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence as relevant to Johnson's situation. First,
the Court wrote: "The fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special
'need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment' in any capital case." /d. at 1986
(quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977).
Second, the Court had made clear that death penalty
decisions could not be predicated on mere "caprice" or
on "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or
totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." /d. (quoting
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983).

Right to Counsel
Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S.Ct. 1792 (1988), involved
the violation of the right to counsel in a capital sentencing hearing. Satterwhite was indicted for a murder
committed during a robbery. Counsel was appointed
thereafter. Unknown to counsel, a psychiatrist interviewed Satterwhite in order to determine his competency
to stand trial, his insanity at the time of the offense, and
his future dangerousness. The latter is an aggravating
circumstance under the Texas death penalty law. After
conviction, the psychiatrist testified at the sentencing
hearing that Satterwhite presented a continuing threat to
society through acts of criminal violence.
The Supreme Court ruled that the psychiatric interview
was unconstitutional under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981), in which the Court had held that defendants formally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amend-·
ment right to counsel before submitting to psychiatric
examinations designed to determine their future dangerousness.
Next, the Court considered whether this violation

Aggravating Circumstances- Vagueness
The defendant in Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct.
1853 (1988), was convicted of first-degree murder and
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sentenced to death. The jury found two aggravating
circumstances: the defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to more than one person, and the murder
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Cartwright
challenged the second aggravating circumstances, arguing that it was unconstitutionally vague. The Tenth Circuit
had upheld that argument and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Court initially distinguished vagueness issues
under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Vagueness questions under Due Process are
based on a lack of notice and can be overcome in any
case where reasonable persons would know that their
conduct was at risk. Unless First Amendment interests
are implicated, a criminal statute is judged for vagueness
on an "as-applied" basis.
The Eighth Amendment analysis is derived from
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S, 238 {1972), where the Court
struck down the death penalty as arbitrary and capricious because it provided no principled way to distinguish those that received the death penalty from those
who did not. As the Court remarked: "Since Furman, our
cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of
the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty
is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." 108 S.Ct. at 1858. Applying this standard in
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court st;uck
down a death sentence based on an aggravating circumstance that the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman." According to the Court, the vague
construction of these words provided "no principled way
to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was
imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." /d. at
433. Similarly, the aggravating circumstance in Cartwright- "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"gave no more guidance and thus violated Eighth Amendment requirements.

thereby be foreclosed from considering that factor.
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The
Court reaffirmed its earlier position concerning mitigating circumstances. "It is beyond dispute that in a capital
case, the sentencer [may] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.' "/d. at 1865 (quoting Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)). In Mills' view a
single juror could not hold out because there must be
unanimity before a mitigating factor could be considered.
The critical issue was the jury's understanding of the
instruction. In reviewing death sentences, the Court has
required greater certainty that jury conclusions rested on
proper grounds. In particular, if two interpretations of the
instructions are possible and one interpretation is
improper, the death sentence must be vacated.
We conclude that there is a substantial probability
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge's
instructions in this case, and in attempting to complete
the verdict form as instructed, well may have thought
they were precluded from considering any mitigating
evidence unless all12 jurors agreed on the existence
of a particular such circumstance. Under our cases,
the sentencer must be permitted to consider all
mitigating evidence. /d. at 1870.
Jury Instructions
The defendant in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S.Ct. 546
(1988), was convicted of 2 counts of manslaughter and 3
counts of first-degree murder. Thereafter, the jury began
deliberating on the death sentence. The next day the
foreman advised the court that the jurors were unable to
reach a decision. The court polled the jury, asking whether each member believed that further deliberation would
be helpful. Eight jurors answered in the affirmative, and
the court sent the jury back to deliberate. A second note
from the foreman indicated that some jurors misunderstood the poll. A second poll revealed that 11 jurors
believed further deliberations would be advisable. The
court then instructed the jury to consult and consider
each other's views with the objective of reaching a
verdict, but not to surrender their own honest beliefs. The
jury returned 30 minutes later with a verdict sentencing
the defendant to death on all three counts of first-degree
murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that the polls
and supplemental instruction coerced the jury into
imposing the death penalty.
On review, the Court rejected this argument. The Court
saw little difference between the supplemental charge
and the traditional Allen charge. In Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492 (1896), the Court upheld a charge that
urged minority members of a hung jury to consider the
views of the majority and to ask themselves whether their
own views were reasonable under the circumstances.
The Court reaffirmed the Allen charge and pointed out
that the instruction in Lowentield was even less coercive
because it was not directed at minority jurors. The Court
also distinguished its decision in Jenkins v. United
States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). In that case the trial judge
instructed the jury: "You have got to reach a decision in
this case." /d. at 446. The Court found this statement to

Mitigating Circumstances
Ralph Mills was convicted of the first-degree murder of
his cellmate and sentenced to death. In Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988), he successfully challenged
that sentence.
After determining guilt, the jury found an aggravating
circumstance- namely, that Mills committed murder
while confined in a correctional institution. The jury was
then to consider mitigating circumstances, after which it
was to balance the aggravating circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances in determining whether the
death penalty was appropriate. The defense offered
evidence in mitigation: Mills' relative youth, his mental
infirmity, his lack of future dangerousness, and the
State's failure to make any meaningful effort to rehabilitate him while incarcerated. On the verdict form, the jury
marked "no" beside each mitigating circumstance and
returned the death penalty. Mills argued that jury instructions and the verdict form led the jury to believe that it
had to agree unanimously to a mitigating circumstance
before it could balance that circumstance against the
aggravating circumstances. Thus, even if eleven jurors
believe some mitigating circumstance or circumstances
were present, they would mark "no" on the form and
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sible.for~his counsel's conduct; clients often must accept
the consequences of their attorney's tactical decisions.

be coercive. IheJnstruction in Lowenfie/d, however,-was
different. It did not require the jurors to reach a decision.
Moreover, the polling of the jury by the trial court was not
prejudicial. The judge had not inquired into the numerical
divisio11 of the jurors, which conduct was found to be
coerciv(3 in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448
(1926). Rather, the court inquired only about whether
further deliberations would be helpful.

"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE
The defendant in Huddleston v. United States, 108
?.Ct. 1496 (1988), was charged with possessing and sellmg stolen goods (video cassette tapes) in interstate
commerce. There was no dispute that the tapes were
stolen; the only issue was whether Huddleston knew that
they were stolen. To prove knowledge, the prosecution
offered evidence of "other acts" under Federal Evidence
Rl,!!e 4Q.1(!2l,w!Jigb provides:
Evidence ofothercdn1~s. wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
One "other act'' involved Huddleston's selling of television sets for very low prices. A second "other act"
involved ttie selling of kitchen appliances for $8000 when'·
the actual cost was $20,000. These appliances had been
stolen. Huddleston claimed that he sold all these items
for Leroy Wesby on a commission basis and that he did
not know that they were stolen.
On appeal, Huddleston argued that the probative

DISCOVERY
The defendant in Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S.Ct. 646 (1988),
was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to trial the
prosecution tiled acinotion requesting a list of defense
witnesses pursuant to the state discovery rules. In
response, the defense identified four witnesses. The
defense amended its list on the first day of trial, adding
two more names. On. the second day of trial, after the
prosecution's two principal witnesses had testified, the
defense attorney made an oral motion to add other
witnesses. Counsel stated that he had just been
informed about the witnesses and had not been able to
locate any of them previously. During a subsequent hearing on this motion, one of the witnesses testified that
counsel had visited his home a week before the trial. This
testimony contradicted defense counsel's representations to the trial court. The court excluded the witness's
testimony because counsel's conduct constituted a
"blatantyiolati_o_n of the _discove_ry ru!es." Tayior argued
that the 1mpos1t1on of th1s sanct1on VIolated his right to
compulsory process.
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
ruling~ The Court's opinion, however, contained limiting
lang!J.~g.§1, £ir§!.J.h~ (:qurt rejected the State's argument
that the Compulsory Process Clause implicated only the
right to subpoena witnesses. The Court rejected this
narrow interpretatioriolfne Clause:··
·
The right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary
process if it did not embrace the right to have the
witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right
to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment even though it is not expressly described in so
many words. /d. at 652.
The right to present defense evidence, however, is not
absolute. It is limited by the State's interest in the orderly
conduct of a criminal trial, including the enforcement of
discovery sanctions. While the Court acknowledged that
preclusion of evidence was a drastic remedy, it was not
willing to forbid its use in the appropriate case. In the
Court's view, other sanctions would be less effective. The
trial court may insist on an explanation when a party fails
to comply with a discovery order.
If that explanation reveals that the omission was willful
and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of crossexamination and the ability to adduce rebuttal
evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply to
exclude the witness' testimony. /d. at 655-56. .
The Court also found the sanction appropriate in this
case. The trial court found a willful and blatant violation
a finding that was supported by the record. Finally, the '
Court saw nothing wrong with holding the client respon-

value of the television sales depended on theii "stolen"
character and that the prosecution never established that
the televisions were in fact stolen. The admissibility issue
depended on the proper standard of proof, an issue on
which the circuit courts had divided. Some courts had
concludedthat"the prosecution must prove the "other
act" by a "preponderance of evidence." Others had ruled
that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard must be
satisfied, Still others had held that the trial judge's decision was limited to determining whether sufficient
evidence from which a jury could find the existence of the
other act was the applicable standard.
. On review, the Supreme Court adopted the last position. Based on Evidence Rule 104(b), this is, in effect, a
prima facie evidence standard. The Court explained:
In determining whether the Government has
in_troduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the
tnal court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional
fact [stolen TVs] by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court simply examines all the evidence in the case
and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the
conditional fact-here, that the televisions were
stolen-by a preponderance of the evidence. /d. at
1501.
According to the Court, the large quantity, the low price,
the lack of a bill of sale, and the sale of other stolen
merchandise satisfied this standard.
ENTRAPMENT
. Matthews v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 883 (1988),
mvolved the entrapment defense. Employed by the Small
Business Administration, Matthews was charged with
accepting a bribe. He was arrested when he took money
from a participant in a S.B.A. program. He sought to raise
an entrapment defense because the participant was
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working with the F.B.I. at the time of the payment. The
district court, however, refused to instruct on entrapment
because Matthews would not admit committing all the
elements of the crime, in particular the mens rea
element. Matthews claimed the money was a personal
loan unrelated to S.B.A. business.
On review, the Supreme Court upheld Matthew's view;
denying the charge and asserting the affirmative defense
of entrapment is permissible. Under federal law, entrapment has two elements: government inducement of the
crime, and lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in criminal conduct. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
The prosecution argued that entrapment presupposed
the commission of the crime and a jury could not logically conclude that Matthews had both failed to commit the
crime and been entrapped. The Court, however, saw
nothing unusual about pleading inconsistent defenses.
For example, in Stevenson v. United States, 162 ~.S. 313
(1896), the Court had held that a murder defendant was
entitled to both a manslaughter and self-defense instruction: "The affirmative defense of self-defense is, of
course, inconsistent with the claim that the defendant
killed in the heat of passion." 108 S.Ct. at 887.
Two points about Matthews are noteworthy. The entrapment defense is not constitutionally based, and thus the
case affects only federal prosecutions. In addition, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion. A Rehnquist opinion that favors a criminal defendant is a rather unique
event.

consider, among others, each of the following factors: the
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances
of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of
a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and
on the administration of justice." In addition, the legislative history indicates that prejudice to the defendant is a
relevant factor. Unfortunately, the district court failed to
specify how it evaluated these factors. In particular, the
defendant's conduct in failing to appear for trial was
apparently not considered. The Court wrote:
The court did not explain how it factored in the seriousness of the offenses with which respondent stood
charged. The District Court relied heavily on its unexplained characterization of the Government conduct
as "lackadaisical," while failing to consider other relevant facts and circumstances leading to dismissal.
Seemingly ignored were the brevity of the delay and
the consequential lack of prejudice to respondent, as
well as respondent's own illicit contribution to the delay.
At bottom, the District Court appears t6 have decided
to dismiss with prejudice in this case in order to send a
strong message to the Government that unexcused
delays will not be tolerated. That factor alone, by definition implicated in almost every Speedy Trial Act case,
does not suffice to justify barring reprosecution in light
of all the other circumstances present. /d. at 2423.
GRAND JURY
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 2373
(1988}, involved a 20-month grand jury investigation,
which resulted in the indictment of eight defendants on
27 counts, including conspiracy, mail fraud, and tax
fraud. The district court dismissed the indictments for
prosecutorial misconduct.
The District Court found that the Government had
violated Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 6(e) by: (1}
disclosing grand jury materials to Internal Revenue
Service employees having civil tax enforcement
responsibilities; (2) failing to give the court prompt
notice of such disclosures; (3) disclosing to potential
witnesses the names of targets of the investigation;
and (4) instructing two grand jury witnesses, who had
represented some of the defendants in a separate
investigation of the same tax shelters, that they were
not to reveal the substance of their testimony or that
they had testified before the grand jury. The court also
found that the Government had violated Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(d) in allowing joint appearances by IRS agents before the grand jury for the
purpose of reading transcripts to the jurors. The
District Court further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly argued with an expert witness
during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave
testimony adverse to the Government. It also held that
the Government had violated the witness immunity
statute ... , by the use of "pocket immunity" (immunity
granted on representation of the prosecutor rather
than by order of a judge), and that the Government
caused IRS agents to mischaracterize testimony given
in prior proceedings. Furthermore, the District Court
found that the Government violated the Fifth Amendment by calling a number of witnesses for the sole
purpose of having them assert their privilege against

SPEEDY TRIAL
United States v. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (1988), involved
the circumstances under which a district court could
dismiss a case with prejudice as a remedy for a violation
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Taylor was indicted for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. His case was scheduled
for trial the day prior to the expiration of the 70-day period
within which the Act requires the prosecution to bring an
indicted defendant to trial. Taylor, however, failed to
appear and a bench warrant was issued. He was subsequently arrested on state charges that were later
dismissed. Commencement of his federal trial was
delayed for a number of reasons, including his appearance as a defense witness in another case and slow
processing by the Government. A superseding indictment, adding a failure-to-appear charge, was eventually
returned.
Taylor then moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
The district court ruled that some of the delay was
reasonable and thus excludable in computing the 70-day
period. Fourteen days of delay, however, were due to the
Government's "lackadaisical behavior" and resulted in a
violation of the Act. Accordingly, the court dismissed the
original counts with prejudice to reprosecution.
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue
before the Court was whether the district court had
abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice.
s.ection 3162(a)(2) provides: "In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall
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self-incrimination and that it had violated the Sixth
Amendment by conducting postindictment interviews
of several high-level employees of The Bank of Nova
Scotia. Finally, the court concluded that the Government had caused IRS agents to be sworn as agents of
the grand jury, thereby elevating their credibility. /d. at
2375-76.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however,
the Court reversed. Initially, the Court ruled that "as a
general matter, a District Court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such
errors prejudiced the defendants." /d. at 2373. The Court
based its ruling on its reading of Rule 52(a), which
requires a harmless error analysis: "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded." In this context, "dismissal of
an indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that
the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's
decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of
such violations." /d. at 2374 (quoting United Statesv.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)(0'Connor, J., concurring). The Court recognized, however, that some violations require automatic reversal without a harmless error
inquiry. For example, racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986), and the exclusion of women, Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), require automatic dismissaL
Those violations, however, were constitutional and a
harmless error analysis would have required unguided
speculation.
Her(3, the Court found no constitutional violation. The
Sixth_Amendment posHndictment violations (interviews
with Bank officials) occurred after the grand jury had
handed down the indictments. In addition, the Court
found no Fifth Amendment violation. The prosecution
was not required to accept a witness' claim of the privilege before testifying; the witnesses could be called and

forced to claim the privilege under oath, so long as questioning ceased once the privilege was claimed.
According to the Court, many of the Ru~e 6 violations
did not affect the grand jury's decision. The use of the
grand jury to gather evidence in civil audits, the violation
of the secrecy provisions by publicly identifying targets,
and the imposed secrecy requirements on witnesses all
fell into this category.
A detailed analysis of other types of violations led the
Court to the same result. Swearing IRS agents as
"agents" of the grand jury did not mislead the jurors
because the record showed that the prosecutors treated
themastfleitown'witriesses, <ifaGt that the jurors understood. Moreover, the presentation of inaccurate
summaries by the IRS agents is not a ground for dismissal. An indictment valid on its face cannot be attached on
the ground that it is based on unreliable or incompetent
evidence. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
Although the prosecutors may have had doubts about
the summaries, the record did not support a finding that
they knew the summaries were false. Moreover, the Government conceded that the treatment of the tax expert
was improper, but the expert testified that this conduct
had not affected his testimony. The Court declined to
decide whether the use of "pocket immunity" was proper. Instead, the Court ruled that this procedure did not
affect the grand jury decision. The jurors knew that these
witnesses had made a dea! with the Government and
that was the relevant consideration. Other errors cited by
the District Court were treated in the same fashion.
None, in the Court's view, affected the grand jury's determination.
Finally, the Court noted the availability of other less
drastic remedies for such alleged violations. These
includecontempt, disciplinary sanctions, and public
ceiisurEi "Sucfiremeaies allow the court to focus on the
culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the
unprejudiced defendant." 108 S.Ct. at 2378.
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